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ABSTRACT 7	
Prenatal exposure to hormones, and to sex hormones in particular, exerts organizational 8	
effects on the brain and these have observable behavioral correlates in adult life. There 9	
are reasons to expect that social behaviors—which are fundamental for the evolutionary 10	
success of humans—might be related to biological factors such as prenatal sex hormone 11	
exposure. Nevertheless, the existing literature is inconclusive as to whether and how 12	
prenatal exposure to testosterone and estrogen, proxied by the second-to-fourth digit 13	
ratio (2D:4D), may predict non-selfish behavior. Here, we investigate this question 14	
using economic experiments with real monetary stakes and analyzing five different 15	
dimensions of social behavior in a comparatively large sample of Caucasian participants 16	
(n=560). For both males and females, our results show no robust association between 17	
right- or left-hand 2D:4D and generosity, bargaining, or trust-related behaviors. We 18	
conclude therefore that there is no correlation between 2D:4D and social behavior in 19	
economic games. 20	
 21	
INTRODUCTION 22	
Human social behavior captivates researchers from many different disciplines, both in 23	
the natural and the social sciences (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Fehr and Fischbacher, 24	
2003; Nowak, 2006). One of the key features of human social architecture is that 25	
institutions are often built upon the sporadic cooperation of thousands, sometimes 26	
millions, unrelated individuals, and this stands as an evolutionary puzzle: How could 27	
behaviors that help others have evolved if they provide a fitness advantage to the 28	
recipient(s) over the actor? 29	
Humans display a large set of different manifestations of social behavior including 30	
generosity, competition, fairness, trust, and reciprocity to name a few. Each of them 31	
seems to have its own particularities and bio-psychological underpinnings (Fehr and 32	
Fischbacher, 2003; Ebstein et al., 2010; Corgnet et al., 2016; Espín et al., 2016a). 33	
However, while our species shows distinctive behavioral patterns in the social domain 34	
compared to other taxa, there is also large individual heterogeneity. Even though we 35	
know that one part of the variation emanates from cultural differences (Henrich et al 36	
2005, 2010; Herrmann et al., 2008), considerable heterogeneity still emerges within 37	
cultural groups. The objective of this study is to analyze the biological roots of such 38	
individual differences.  39	
Given the relevance of social skills and associated behaviors for the evolutionary 40	
success of humans, one source of variation might indeed be biological. In fact, many 41	
studies—without relying on any particular biological trait—suggest that social behavior 42	
is heritable or genetically determined to some extent (Wallace et al., 2007; Cesarini et 43	
al., 2008, 2009; Ebstein et al., 2010). Along these lines, different biological and genetic 44	
factors at certain times of development might generate predispositions towards different 45	
social behaviors (Van Lange et al., 1997; Wingfield et al., 1998; Repetti et al., 2002; 46	
Fries et al., 2005). One of such factors may be associated with the amount of hormones 47	
individuals are exposed to during prenatal development (Knickmeyer et al., 2005; 48	
Auyeung et al., 2009; Berenbaum and Beltz, 2011). Fetal exposure to hormones such as 49	
androgens and cortisol is known to exert organizational effects on the human body and 50	
brain which may, in turn, influence behavior later in life (Baron-Cohen et al.; 2005; 51	
Cohen-Bedehan et al., 2005; Davis and Sandman, 2010; Lombardo et al., 2012). Since 52	
hormonal levels are under strong genetic influence (Harris et al., 1998; Bartels et al., 53	
2003), this may represent one possible channel for the intergenerational transmission of 54	
behavior.  55	
With regards to social behavior, sex hormones, and androgens in particular, have 56	
attracted considerable attention and there is now a plethora of studies on the behavioral 57	
correlates of circulating (either endogenous or administered) testosterone levels 58	
(Burnham, 2007; Zak et al., 2009; Zethraeus et al., 2009; Bos et al., 2010; Eisenegger et 59	
al. 2010, 2011; van Honk et al., 2012).  60	
In this paper, rather than circulating hormones, we focus on the organizational effects of 61	
prenatal exposure to testosterone. More specifically, we explore the relationship 62	
between fetal testosterone exposure and social behavior in economic experiments. 63	
Previous studies have typically used the second-to-fourth digit ratio (2D:4D) as a 64	
putative marker of prenatal exposure to testosterone or, more precisely, of the relative 65	
exposure to testosterone compared to estradiol while in uterus (Lutchmaya et al., 2004). 66	
We also stick to this measure. Although direct evidence for the 2D:4D-fetal sex 67	
hormones link only exists for mice (Zheng and Cohn, 2011), rats (Talarovičová et al., 68	
2009; Auger et al. 2013), and birds (Romano et al., 2005), there exists large indirect 69	
evidence and the ratio is commonly accepted as a proxy of fetal hormone exposure 70	
(also) in humans. 2D:4D is calculated such that lower ratios correspond to higher 71	
exposure to testosterone and lower exposure to estrogen. Consequently, males tend to 72	
display lower 2D:4D values than females (Manning, 2002). Many studies have analyzed 73	
the association between 2D:4D and diverse aspects of social involvement, ranging from 74	
status seeking (Manning and Fink, 2008) to positioning in social networks (Kovářík et 75	
al., 2017). Others have linked 2D:4D with certain diseases associated to decreased 76	
social skills, such as autism (see e.g. Al-Zaid et al. 2015 and Manning et al. 2001).  77	
Regarding the economic games designed to elicit (pro)social preferences, the literature 78	
has been inconclusive as to whether and how 2D:4D predicts subjects’ social behavior. 79	
Some studies report negative effects of fetal testosterone on behaviors such as 80	
generosity, cooperation, or trust (Cecchi and Duchoslav, 2018; de Neys et al., 2013), 81	
whereas others indicate positive effects on fair or normative behaviors (Millet and 82	
Dewitte, 2006, 2009; Van den Bergh and Dewitte, 2006; Ronay and Galinsky, 2011; 83	
Buser, 2012). Null and non-linear relationships have also been frequently reported 84	
(Miller and Dewitte, 2009; Sanchez-Pages and Turiegano, 2010, 2013; Brañas-Garza et 85	
al., 2013; Galizzi and Nieboer, 2015; Parslow et al. 2018). Moreover, other studies find 86	
2D:4D-context interactive effects where situational cues change the relationship 87	
between 2D:4D and social behavior. For example, Van den Berg and Dewitte (2006) 88	
observe that lower 2D:4D either increases or decreases rejection rates in the UG 89	
depending on whether subjects are in a neutral or sex-related context, respectively, 90	
whereas Millet and Dewitte (2009) detect either a negative or positive association 91	
between 2D:4D and giving in DGs, depending on whether participants are primed with 92	
cues of aggression or not.  93	
In sum, the existing evidence provides no specific hypothesis regarding the how 2D:4D 94	
organizes prosocial behavior. It is worth noting that some of these papers are based on 95	
hypothetical decisions with no monetary consequences.  96	
Three features of this study distinguish it from previous research. First, we use a 97	
(comparatively) large sample size that permits for high statistical power. Our sample 98	
consists of a total of 560 Caucasian individuals (330 women). This means that we will 99	
be able to find a small effect size (specifically, r = 0.12) with 80% power and α = 0.05. 100	
Among the existing economic experiments similar to ours, which effectively measure 101	
the participants’ fingers length rather than relying on self-reports, the largest Caucasian 102	
sample is that in Galizzi and Nieboer (2015) with a total of 201 Caucasians within an 103	
ethnically diverse sample of 602 individuals. More recently, Parslow et al. (2018) study 104	
a sample of 330 women, but they do not report the ethnicity.  105	
Second, we elicit five dimensions of social behavior using three economic games. All 106	
our participants decided, in random order, as Dictators in the Dictator Game (Forsythe 107	
et al., 1994), as both Proposers and Responders in the Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 108	
1982), and as both Trustors and Trustees in the Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995; see 109	
Methods). For each subject, we thus gathered measures in the domains of generosity 110	
(Dictator Game), bargaining (Ultimatum Game) and trust and reciprocity (Trust Game). 111	
Finally, our dataset allows us to control for a number of potential confounding factors, 112	
such as, for instance, cognitive reflection (Bosch-Domènech et al., 2014; Cueva et al., 113	
2016) or risk preferences (Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011; Brañas-Garza et al., 114	
2018).  115	
 116	
METHODS 117	
Participants and general protocol 118	
In October 2011, all the first-year students (n=927) at the School of Economics of the 119	
University of Granada (Spain) were invited to participate in a survey/experiment at the 120	
EGEO Experimental Economics Lab. Participation was voluntary and the number of 121	
participants ended up being 659 (71% of the population), distributed in 27 sessions. 122	
Students were officially invited to visit the lab by the Dean of the School so that the 123	
original objective was not to earn money but to visit the lab, reducing potential self-124	
selection issues with participants of laboratory economic experiments (Abeler and 125	
Nosenzo, 2015). We consider the participation rate of 71% very high. Once seated in 126	
their respective cubicles (which impeded visual contact between them), the students 127	
were invited to complete a survey and to play a variety of experimental games using a 128	
computer interface. None of those who showed up in the lab refused to participate. In 129	
the analysis below, we exclude from the sample individuals with missing values in any 130	
of the variables applied in this paper. To ensure ethnic homogeneity (Manning et al., 131	
2007), non-Caucasian subjects were also excluded. The resulting sample size is 560 132	
Caucasian subjects (230 males; age: mean ± SD = 17.97 ±1.82). 133	
In each session, the participants were first asked to fill the socio-demographic and 134	
personality characteristics section, including self-reported measures of life satisfaction, 135	
self-esteem, risk preferences, and trust in others. In addition, the survey contained a 136	
math test with four simple questions. After the survey, the subjects were explained in 137	
detail all the economic games they would face and then played all the games in a 138	
random order (24 different orders). Once finished with the computerized part, the 139	
subjects participated in a paper-and-pencil version of the Cognitive Reflection Test 140	
(Frederick, 2005). No time pressure was imposed in any of the stages. In what follows, 141	
we explain in detail the elicitation and the structure of our three main variable types.  142	
2D:4D measurement 143	
At the end of each session, the participants were scanned their both hands using a high-144	
resolution scanner (Canon Slide 90). The lengths of the index and ring fingers were 145	
measured from the scanned images as the distance from the middle of the basal crease 146	
to the tip of the finger using Photoshop (see Neyse and Brañas-Garza, 2014). Computer-147	
assisted measurements of 2D:4D from scanned pictures have been found to be more 148	
precise and reliable than measurements using other methods (Allaway et al., 2009; 149	
Kemper and Schwerdtfeger, 2009). The 2D:4D of each hand was measured twice at an 150	
interval of one month by the same experienced researcher (not involved in this paper). 151	
These measurements displayed a high repeatability (right hand: intraclass correlation 152	
coefficient (ICC) = 0.9566, p < 0.001, left hand: ICC = 0.9440, p < 0.001) and were 153	
averaged to obtain a single value of the 2D:4D ratio for each hand. As expected, the 154	
left-hand and right-hand 2D:4Ds were correlated within individuals (r = 0.67, p=0.000 155	
for males; r =0.71, p=0.000 for females; Pearson correlation) and males displayed lower 156	
2D:4D than females (right hand means: 2D:4DM =0.960, 2D:4DF =0.972, p=0.000; left 157	
hand means: 2D:4DM =0.965, 2D:4DF =0.976, p=0.000; t-test). 158	
Social behavior measurement - Economic games 159	
Our experiment consists of three canonical two-person games: the Dictator Game (DG, 160	
henceforth), the Ultimatum Game (UG), and the Trust Game (TG). The games were 161	
faced by each participant in random order and all participants played both roles in each 162	
game. For each decision, participants would be matched with a different anonymous 163	
individual selected at random among the other participants.  164	
In the DG, one player, the Dictator, had to propose a division of €20 between herself 165	
and another anonymous participant, the Receiver, who could not but accept the 166	
proposed division. In our experiment, subjects were only allowed to propose the split in 167	
€2 increments. Below, we employ the amount of money donated to the other participant 168	
(DG offer) as a measure of generosity. Even though no subject played the role of the 169	
Receiver for obvious reasons, they could actually have been paid for this role if selected 170	
to make sure that Dictators’ decisions affect others. 171	
In the UG (Güth et al., 1982; see Figure 1), one player, the Proposer, had to propose a 172	
division of €20 between herself and another anonymous participant, the Responder, 173	
who—in contrast to the DG—could either accept or reject the proposal. If the latter 174	
accepted, the proposed division was implemented; in case of rejection, neither 175	
participant earned anything. Each subject participated in both roles. The offer made to 176	
the Responder will be our measure of Proposers’ bargaining behavior. For the role of 177	
Responder, we used the strategy method: each subject had to state her willingness to 178	
accept or reject each of the possible proposals without knowing the offer of the 179	
Proposer. Below, we employ the minimum acceptable offer (mao, thereafter)—the 180	
minimum amount of money that a subject would accept—as our measure of 181	
Responders’ behavior. Such approach is common in the literature and the mao is 182	
typically interpreted as indicative for the Responder’s willingness to punish the 183	
Proposer at a personal cost (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich et al., 2005; 184	
Brañas-Garza et al., 2006, Burnham 2007; Brañas-Garza et al., 2014).  185	
Figure 1. Ultimatum (left) and Trust (right) Games in strategic form implemented 186	
in our study. The figure shows the payments (in €) associated to each of the possible 187	
outcomes for the Proposer (Trustor) and Responder (Trustee) in the Ultimatum (Trust) 188	
Game. The Dictator Game only differs from the Ultimatum Game in that the rejection 189	
option does not exist in the second stage and the payoffs consequently are (20-X,X). 190	
 191	
         192	
 193	
As for the TG, we employ a binary version of the game (Ermisch et al., 2009) and again 194	
resort to the strategy method. More precisely, one player, the Trustor, had to decide 195	
whether to pass €10 or €0 to the Trustee. If she passed €0, the Trustor earned €10 and 196	
the Trustee nothing; if she rather passed €10 (i.e., the Trustor trusted the Trustee), the 197	
latter would receive 4 × €10 = €40. In such a case, the Trustee had to decide whether to 198	
either send back €22 and keep €18 for herself (that is, being trustworthy) or keep all €40 199	
without sending anything back, in which case the Trustor would not earn anything. The 200	
Trustor’s decision thus measures trust, whereas the Trustee’s decision measures positive 201	
reciprocity. Figure 1 displays the extensive form of the TG implemented. In the analysis 202	
below, TG trust=1 if the participant chose to pass the money to the Trustee and 0 203	
otherwise. Similarly, TG reciprocity=1 if as a Trustee the participant chose to return the 204	
money to the Trustor and 0 otherwise. 205	
Decisions were not hypothetical. Participants’ payoffs were computed according to their 206	
decisions in the games and/or those of a randomly matched participant. The identity of 207	
the other player remained anonymous. One of every ten participants was randomly 208	
selected to be paid, and the final payoff was determined by a randomly selected role. 209	
The average earnings of those selected for payment, including those winning €0 210	
(11.43%), were €10.43. 211	
 212	
Additional variables 213	
As noted before, we administered all participants a survey eliciting a large amount of 214	
information (including gender, age, household income, math skills, and social capital). 215	
Besides we also include questions on life satisfaction, cognitive abilities and risk 216	
attitudes. 217	
We measured participants’ subjective well-being through the life satisfaction question 218	
(Zilioli et al., 2015; Espín et al., 2016b): “In a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means 219	
‘completely unsatisfied’ and 7 means ‘completely satisfied’, in general, how satisfied 220	
are you with your life?”.  221	
In addition, we also control for two measures of cognitive functioning. The first one is 222	
given by the number of correct responses in a simple math skills test (from 0 to 4). The 223	
second one measures the participants’ tendency to reflect on their first intuition (i.e., 224	
their cognitive style, intuitive vs. reflective) and is given by the number of correct 225	
answers (from 0 to 3) in the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). Cognitive 226	
skills and cognitive styles have been previously related to both social behaviors (Burks 227	
et al. 2009; Corgnet et al., 2015, 2016; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2016; Cabrales et al., 2017; 228	
Capraro et al., 2017) and 2D:4D (Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011; Bosch-Domènech 229	
et al., 2014; Cueva et al., 2017) and thus represent potential confounding factors.  230	
Finally, our battery of controls includes three measures for participants’ risk attitudes 231	
obtained from a series of binary decisions involving (hypothetical) monetary lotteries. 232	
Risk attitudes may correlate with both social behavior (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; 233	
Corgnet et al., 2016) and 2D:4D (e.g. Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011; Brañas-Garza 234	
et al., 2018). 235	
Econometric analysis 236	
We first run a series of regression models. Our five social behavior measures (DG offer, 237	
UG offer, UG mao, TG trust, and TG reciprocity) are regressed on 2D:4D and 2D:4D-238	
squared (2D:4D-sq). Additionally, since 2D:4D is sexually dimorphic, the relation 239	
between 2D:4D and behavioral traits is often gender-specific (Auyeung et al., 2009; 240	
Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011), the adherence to sharing rules may differ across 241	
men and women (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Espinosa and Kovářík, 2015), and 242	
testosterone affects men and women asymmetrically (Zethraeus et al., 2009; Eisenegger 243	
et al., 2010), we use a male dummy to control for gender and the interaction between 244	
gender and either 2D:4D or 2D:4D-squared. The regressions are conducted both with 245	
and without other control variables and for both the left- and right-hand 2D:4D. The 246	
control variables are order effects, age, income, life satisfaction, social capital, math, 247	
reflection, and risk attitudes. We use OLS regressions for DG offer, UG offer, and UG 248	
mao, and logistic regressions for TG trust and TG reciprocity. 249	
The analysis was performed using Stata/SE 15.1 (StataCorp). 250	
Ethics Statement 251	
All participants were informed about the content of the experiment before they 252	
participated and provided written consent. Besides, their anonymity was always 253	
preserved (in agreement with the Spanish Law 15/1999 for Personal Data Protection) by 254	
assigning them a random numerical code, which would identify them in the system. No 255	
association was ever made between their real names and the results. As it is standard in 256	
socio-economic experiments, no ethic concerns are involved other than preserving the 257	
anonymity of participants. This procedure was checked and approved by the Vice dean 258	
of Research of the School of Economics of the University of Granada, the institution 259	
hosting the experiment. 260	
 261	
RESULTS 262	
Tables 1 – 5 report the estimates of a series of models in which we regress the behavior 263	
in a particular role in a particular game on all the combinations of 2D:4D, 2D:4D-264	
squared, and a gender dummy (including interactions of the two former measures with 265	
the latter). The models are conducted both with and without control variables and for 266	
the left and right hands separately.  267	
 268	
This exercise provides a clear message: 2D:4D is not systematically related to the 269	
subjects’ behavior in any economic game under scrutiny. Independently of the 270	
dependent variable and the model specification, in a total of 40 regressions, there does 271	
not appear to be any single significant effect of 2D:4D at less than 5% level. The very 272	
few effects which are significant at the 10% level disappear if we either include 273	
additional control variables and/or adjust for multiple comparisons.  274	
 275	
These findings reveal that 2D:4D is not systematically related to behavior in our data 276	
and that the effects do not depend on gender. That is, the null results hold for both males 277	
and females. Since the preformed multiple comparison procedures only corroborate the 278	
null findings from Tables 1 - 5, we do not report them here. 279	
 280	
 281	
DISCUSSION 282	
This article contributes to the recent literature analyzing the link between prenatal 283	
exposure to testosterone and estrogen, proxied by the second-to-fourth digit ratio 284	
(2D:4D) and prosocial behavior in economic games. We investigate this question using 285	
three canonical two-person games—the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the 286	
Trust Game—in the lab with real monetary incentives.  287	
Our experimental set up thus comprises five different dimensions of social behavior: 288	
generosity, bargaining, fairness, trust and reciprocity. Subjects faced games in rrandom 289	
order. It is important to remark that our study uses a large sample of Caucasian 290	
participants (n=560) with enough power to find a small effect size (specifically, r = 291	
0.12) with 80% power and α = 0.05.   292	
For both males and females, our results show no robust association between right- or 293	
left-hand 2D:4D and generosity, bargaining, or trust-related behaviors in any of the 40 294	
regressions conducted. We conclude therefore that there is no direct correlation between 295	
2D:4D and social behavior in economic games. These results are in line with the null 296	
findings in a recent study by Parslow et al. (2018), who relate the Dictator Game giving 297	
to 2D:4D in a sample of 330 Swedish women (exactly the same number of women as in 298	
our sample). 299	
How can we reconcile the differing findings in the literature analyzing the association 300	
between 2D:4D and prosocial behavior? It has been argued more generally that—301	
similarly to its circulating counterpart (Mazur and Booth, 1998; Eisenegger et al., 302	
2011)—prenatal testosterone can be understood as a marker for social status (Millet, 303	
2011). The evidence indeed suggests that the association between 2D:4D and other 304	
traits is moderated by the context and its relation to status attainment. Low 2D:4D 305	
(reflecting high testosterone exposure) robustly predicts aggressive or retaliation 306	
behavior only if status is at stake or if aggression is provoked (Millet and Dewitte, 307	
2007; Ronay and Galinsky, 2011), while many inconsistencies arise in neutral settings 308	
(Millet, 2011; Ryckmans et al., 2015). Furthermore, it seems that this association is 309	
more robust using real-life behaviors and outcomes, compared to hypothetical and lab 310	
environments (see Millet and Buehler, 2018, for an extensive discussion and review of 311	
the evidence). Similarly, Brañas-Garza et al. (2018) document a negative correlation 312	
between risk taking and 2D:4D only if the elicitation of risk attitudes is incentivized—313	
and thus potentially relevant for status attainment—but not in a hypothetical task. Millet 314	
and Buehler (2018) provide a direct test of the moderating effect of a status-related 315	
framing and find strong evidence supporting this hypothesis. These examples are in line 316	
with the status- or dominance-related interpretation of the 2D:4D-behavior linkage 317	
(Millet, 2011). This interpretation brings the argument that fetal testosterone mainly 318	
manifests itself through enhancing the sensitivity to its circulating counterpart, 319	
supported by the observation that administered testosterone only affects low 2D:4D 320	
individuals (Buskens et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2016; see also Millet and Buehler, 2018). 321	
The role of circulating testosterone in status-related situations is widely documented 322	
(e.g. Burnham, 2007; Zak et al., 2009; Eisenegger et al., 2011).  323	
The above discussion might also explain the differing findings across studies analyzing 324	
prosocial behavior: prosocial behavior might be affected by contextual variables 325	
similarly and not controlling for the context might generate omitted-variable issues 326	
(Millet, 2011). In our neutral setting without priming status, dominance, or any 327	
competition but in which all tasks are incentivized, neither (pro)sociality nor selfishness 328	
is ex ante status-enhancing and we may expect—and find—little relation between 329	
2D:4D and behavior. This conclusion notwithstanding, these arguments clearly point to 330	
the need of exploring potential interactions of 2D:4D with contextual factors in future 331	
research. 332	
 333	
 334	
Table 1. DG offer as a function of 2D:4D 335	
 
RIGHT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D 7.038* 
(0.056) 
5.717 
(0.120) 
-177.111 
(0.208) 
-121.709 
(0.387) 
3.197 
(0.462) 
1.927 
(0.664) 
-251.985 
(0.143) 
-216.667 
(0.202) 
Male 0.070 
(0.812) 
0.005 
(0.988) 
0.058 
(0.844) 
-0.005 
(0.987) 
-9.046 
(0.229) 
-8.914 
(0.247) 
-37.451 
(0.787) 
-62.821 
(0.671) 
2D:4D2 
  
94.754 
(0.189) 
65.543 
(0.364) 
  
130.738 
(0.138) 
111.933 
(0.199) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
9.449 
(0.220) 
9.248 
(0.240) 
65.609 
(0.818) 
118.630 
(0.697) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
-27.678 
(0.850) 
-55.411 
(0.723) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
LEFT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D 7.504* 
(0.084) 
5.784 
(0.166) 
-97.719 
(0.642) 
-145.191 
(0.497) 
1.579 
(0.759) 
0.294 
(0.953) 
-125.801 
(0.622) 
-185.837 
(0.472) 
Male 0.062 
(0.833) 
-0.002 
(0.995) 
0.061 
(0.835) 
-0.006 
(0.986) 
-14.252 
(0.106) 
-13.185 
(0.139) 
16.890 
(0.931) 
0.940 
(0.996) 
2D:4D2 
  
54.083 
(0.616) 
77.589 
(0.479) 
  
65.308 
(0.619) 
95.412 
(0.473) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
14.769 
(0.101) 
13.606 
(0.134) 
-50.361 
(0.900) 
-16.761 
(0.969) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
34.008 
(0.868) 
16.272 
(0.941) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
Estimates of OLS regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 336	
  337	
Table 2. UG offer as a function of 2D:4D 338	
 
RIGHT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D -0.795 
(0.685) 
-0.754 
(0.706) 
119.560 
(0.103) 
99.483 
(0.1429 
-19.49 
(0.448) 
-1.417 
(0.577) 
66.154 
(0.521) 
48.608 
(0.619) 
Male 0.095 
(0.529) 
0.111 
(0.531) 
0.103 
(0.496) 
0.118 
(0.503) 
-2.643 
(0.494) 
-1.464 
(0.701) 
-59.721 
(0.420) 
-61.474 
(0.397) 
2D:4D2 
  
-61.929 
(0.100) 
-51.559 
(0.138) 
  
-34.891 
(0.508) 
-25.629 
(0.607) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
2.838 
(0.475) 
1.633 
(0.675) 
121.941 
(0.425) 
126.595 
(0.398) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
-62.049 
(0.430) 
-64.970 
(0.399) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
 
LEFT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D -1.016 
(0.655) 
-0.903 
(0.703) 
40.589 
(0.652) 
31.333 
(0.742) 
-3.306 
(0.205) 
-3.009 
(0.244) 
-45.680 
(0.569) 
-62.339 
(0.492) 
Male 0.094 
(0.531) 
0.110 
(0.535) 
0.094 
(0.529) 
0.111 
(0.533) 
-5.440 
(0.251) 
-4.965 
(0.297) 
-91.337 
(0.357) 
-99.727 
(0.375) 
2D:4D2 
  
-21.384 
(0.643) 
-16.570 
(0.733) 
  
21.725 
(0.598) 
30.412 
(0.513) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
5.709 
(0.240) 
5.236 
(0.281) 
182.295 
(0.370) 
200.627 
(0.387) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
-91.274 
(0.384) 
-100.610 
(0.400) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
Estimates of OLS regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 339	
 340	
  341	
Table 3. UG MAO as a function of 2D:4D 342	
 
RIGHT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D -0.525 
(0.890) 
-1.804 
(0.621) 
-104.860 
(0.477) 
-37.509 
(0.792) 
-1.910 
(0.673) 
-3.282 
(0.455) 
-79.306 
(0.609) 
-44.706 
(0.775) 
Male -0.243 
(0.367) 
0.033 
(0.908) 
-0.250 
(0.352) 
0.030 
(0.916) 
-3.531 
(0.647) 
-3.480 
(0.636) 
54.744 
(0.730) 
11.729 
(0.949) 
2D:4D2 
  
53.686 
(0.479) 
18.366 
(0.802)   
31.678 
(0.618) 
21.218 
(0.791) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
3.408 
(0.670) 
3.641 
(0.633) 
-118.279 
(0.719) 
-28.341 
(0.930) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
63.439 
(0.708) 
16.785 
(0.919) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
 
LEFT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D 0.389 
(0.920) 
-1.110 
(0.773) 
-317.134* 
(0.075) 
-185.407 
(0.302) 
2.419 
(0.617) 
0.730 
(0.880) 
-282.032 
(0.197) 
-166.678 
(0.470) 
Male -0.231 
(0.391) 
0.043 
(0.880) 
-0.234 
(0.384) 
0.039 
(0.891) 
4.673 
(0.551) 
4.477 
(0.554) 
134.006 
(0.851) 
11.825 
(0.949) 
2D:4D2 
  
163.201* 
(0.076) 
94.759 
(0.306)   
145.838 
(0.195) 
85.843 
(0.470) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
-5.060 
(0.531) 
-4.575 
(0.558) 
-67.432 
(0.857) 
-20.782 
(0.957) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
33.088 
(0.864) 
8.886 
(0.964) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
Estimates of OLS regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 343	
  344	
Table 4. TG trust as a function of 2D:4D 345	
 
RIGHT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D 1.463 
(0.594) 
0.878 
(0.760) 
-38.939 
(0.733) 
-31.118 
(0.782) 
1.961 
(0.573) 
1.489 
(0.679) 
-55.377 
(0.692) 
-50.114 
(0.721) 
Male 0.287 
(0.136) 
0.124 
(0.559) 
0.284 
(0.140) 
0.122 
(0.566) 
1.544 
(0.777) 
1.662 
(0.774) 
-25.762 
(0.827) 
-32.615 
(0.780) 
2D:4D2 
  
20.799 
(0.723) 
16.465 
(0.776)   
29.405 
(0.682) 
26.431 
(0.713) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
-1.304 
(0.818) 
-1.596 
(0.790) 
54.763 
(0.821) 
68.952 
(0.774) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
-28.748 
(0.818) 
-36.259 
(0.770) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no Yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
 
LEFT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D -1.627 
(0.597) 
-1.627 
(0.597) 
172.769 
(0.160) 
182.877 
(0.147) 
0.879 
(0.818) 
-0.011 
(0.998) 
295.392* 
(0.055) 
292.150* 
(0.061) 
Male 0.092 
(0.665) 
0.092 
(0.665) 
0.263 
(0.173) 
0.092 
(0.666) 
4.292 
(0.464) 
4.265 
(0.494) 
154.786 
(0.233) 
137.625 
(0.320) 
2D:4D2 
  
-89.122 
(0.158) 
-94.812 
(0.143)   
-151.029* 
(0.055) 
-149.861* 
(0.061) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
-4.158 
(0.491) 
-4.307 
(0.502) 
-313.274 
(0.241) 
-278.120 
(0.328) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
158.553 
(0.248) 
140.384 
(0.336) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
Estimates of logistic regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 346	
  347	
Table 5. TG reciprocity as a function of 2D:4D 348	
 
RIGHT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D 1.093 
(0.707) 
1.696 
(0.588) 
-153.481 
(0.220) 
-178.953 
(0.149) 
-3.042 
(0.416) 
-2.541 
(0.529) 
-204.001 
(0.218) 
-253.795 
(0.153) 
Male 0.197 
(0.355) 
0.052 
(0.828) 
0.187 
(0.378) 
0.035 
(0.884) 
-10.587* 
(0.070) 
-10.932* 
(0.072) 
48.031 
(0.705) 
59.753 
(0.663) 
2D:4D2 
  
79.600 
(0.216) 
92.967 
(0.146)   
102.783 
(0.224) 
128.311 
(0.156) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
11.204* 
(0.065) 
11.417* 
(0.070) 
-114.918 
(0.661) 
-141.702 
(0.618) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
67.768 
(0.616) 
82.686 
(0.574) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
 
LEFT HAND 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2D:4D 2.105 
(0.501) 
2.182 
(0.527) 
-126.253 
(0.459) 
-156.532 
(0.392) 
-0.573 
(0.881) 
-0.893 
(0.8349 
-292.803 
(0.240) 
-355.024 
(0.180) 
Male 0.206 
(0.336) 
0.055 
(0.821) 
0.206 
(0.337) 
0.054 
(0.823) 
-6.833 
(0.287) 
-8.055 
(0.240) 
-163.398 
(0.321) 
-193.792 
(0.273) 
2D:4D2 
  
66.049 
(0.452) 
81.692 
(0.386)   
141.745 
(0.243) 
181.472 
(0.183) 
2D:4D *Male 
    
7.279 
(0.273) 
8.392 
(0.237) 
328.816 
(0.332) 
389.684 
(0.285) 
2D:4D2*Male 
      
-164.920 
(0.344) 
-195.486 
(0.298) 
Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
Estimates of logistic regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 349	
 350	
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